







Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid 
Pricing: A Dilemma for 
California and Beyond
 
Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing 
would provide power purchasers substantial relief from 
soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate 
consequence of its introduction would be a radical change 
in bidding behavior that would introduce new 
inefﬁciencies, weaken competition in new generation, 
and impede expansion in capacity.
 




n November 2000, the California 
Power Exchange appointed a 
panel to investigate “whether the 
current rules for determining the 
market price in the California 
Power Exchange Day-Ahead mar-
ket results in a fair and efﬁcient 
price for electricity in California.” 
More speciﬁcally, the authors of 
this article were called upon to 
express an opinion on whether the 
successful sellers of power in that 
market should all receive the uni-
form, market-clearing price (as 
they were under the Power 
Exchange rules) or, instead, their 
several bid prices—that is, the 
prices at which each offered its 
energy blocks. Those approaches 
typically are referred to as “uni-
form pricing” and “pay-as-bid,” 
respectively.
The timing of the commission 
proved to be ironic. Inspired by 
what was almost universally per-
ceived as the progressively unsat-
isfactory behavior of the several 
associated deregulated California 
energy markets—characterized by 
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mer 2000 and winter 2000–01—the 
performance of these markets so 
deteriorated, exhibiting such 
extreme price spikes both on and 
off peak, as to raise fundamental 
questions about the structural 
design of the deregulated indus-
try, if not about deregulation itself. 
In these dramatically altered cir-
cumstances, the suggested remedy 
we were called upon to evaluate 
has virtually disappeared from 
view.
e were neither commis-
sioned nor had the oppor-
tunity to reach settled conclusions 
about other possible remedies, pal-
liative or fundamental, for these 
unsatisfactory developments; or to 
apportion responsibility between 
the structure of the deregulated 
market and other, external circum-
stances—such as high natural gas 
prices, unexpectedly rapid growth 
in demand, lower-than-expected 
availability of hydro power, 
extremes of summer and winter 
weather throughout the West, 
plant shutdowns for maintenance 
and emission constraints—that 
would in any event have had pain-
ful consequences. This article 
focuses only on answering the nar-
rower but nevertheless important 
question posed to us.
In sum, our response is that the 
expectation behind the proposal 
to shift from uniform to as-bid 
pricing—that the shift would pro-
vide purchasers of electric power 
substantial relief from the soaring 
prices of electric power such as 
they have recently experienced—is 
simply mistaken. The immediate 
consequence of the introduction of 
as-bid pricing would be a radical 











ﬁciencies in the dispatch of power 
and impose new costs on generat-
ing companies, which would inev-





Tend to weaken the competi-
tion in generation that is the best 
safeguard against exertions of 
environment in which, as several 
studies have concluded, some 
generators possess, and have 
exercised, substantial monopoly 
power at times when demand 
presses hard on supply. We do so, 
ﬁrst, in terms of the relative sus-
ceptibilities of the two auction 
systems to exertions of that 
power, and second, the likely 
effect of the proposed change on 
the fundamental remedy—the 
erosion of that power by competi-
tive entry and expansions of 
capacity. Finally, even though, as 
has been already pointed out, we 
are not in a position to recom-
mend other, more promising rem-
edies, we feel obliged, in view of 
our negative appraisal of this par-
ticular proposed reform, at least 
to mention other possible ones, 
among those already being 
widely considered, that seem 
likely to be more effective.
 
I. Pay-As-Bid vs. Uniform 
Price in a Price-Taking 
(Competitive) Environment
 
In this section, we examine the 
merits and drawbacks of these two 
bidding systems on the assump-
tion—on which deregulation itself 
was predicated—that the whole-
sale electricity market is or can be 
effectively competitive. We recog-
nize, of course, that the argument 
for moving to pay-as-bid is typi-
cally predicated on the belief that 
the recent extreme price spikes 
have reﬂected the exercise of 
monopoly power, but reserve our 
assessment of the issue in that con-
text for the next section.
Under the present uniform-
 
The expectation 
behind the proposal 
to shift from 
uniform to 




monopoly power, such as may 
have contributed to the sharp price 





Impede—again to an unmea-
surable extent—the expansion of 
capacity that, along with intensi-
ﬁed demand-side response, is the 
only fundamental remedy for the 
recent poor performance of these 
markets.
The following sections, ﬁrst 
examine the likely effect of a 
change from uniform price to pay-
as-bid on bidding behavior and 
market performance in a competi-
tive environment. We then con-









pricing rules, suppliers in an effec-
tively competitive market have 
every reason to bid approximately 





 in each of the blocks of 
power that they offer. They know 
that if any of those bids is rejected 
because there are lower bids sufﬁ-
cient to satisfy the demand, they 
will be better off, because they will 
not have committed themselves to 
sales at prices that fail to cover 
their avoidable costs. More impor-
tant, they know also that on their 
accepted bids they will receive the 
full beneﬁt of whatever price 
above that level is necessary to 
equate demand and supply in the 
market, regardless of the level of 
their own bids, permitting them to 
pocket the difference between their 
avoidable costs and the market-
clearing price as a necessary con-
tribution toward recovery of their 
ﬁxed charges and proﬁts.
ust as with the economic dis-
patch of power practiced by 
power pools—dispatching power, 
that is to say, in merit order of gen-
erators from lowest to the highest 
marginal cost output necessary to 
meet demand—the consequence is 
that power is supplied at the mini-
mum cost at each point in time. 
(As for the behavior of costs over 
time, the theory of deregulation is, 
of course, that the pressures of 
competition will force generators 
to minimize their costs in order to 
maximize the proﬁts they can earn 
from the competitively determined 
market clearing prices.) So long as 
competition is effective (which 
condition, to repeat, we recognize 
is unlikely to be fully satisﬁed 
today), any generator that with-
holds power in hope, by so doing, 
of raising the market-clearing price 
and so earning monopoly proﬁts, 
will ﬁnd itself displaced by com-
petitors bidding their own, lower, 
marginal costs. The only conse-
quence for withholding power 
would therefore be a sacriﬁce of 
the difference between the compet-
itive, market clearing price and its 
incremental cost of producing the 
output it has withheld.
The naïve expectation of advo-
MWh, the market clearing price of 
$50 will, under the uniform price 
system, bestow on the successful 
bidders markups above marginal 
costs of $20, $10, and zero, respec-
tively, and pay-as-bid will reduce 
those markups all to zero and the 
average price to $40.
he critical assumption is that 
after the market rules are 
changed, generators will bid just 
as they had before. The one abso-
lute certainty, however, is that they 
will not. Knowing that unless they 
changed their bidding practice 
under the new system they would 
receive only their avoidable costs 
on all their successful bids—yield-
ing them no contribution to their 
ﬁxed or common costs, let alone 
proﬁts—they obviously will uni-
versally change their practice 





 will turn out to be 
the market-clearing price—$50 in 
the foregoing simple example.
To the extent that the several bid-
ders were able perfectly to predict 
the market-clearing price, in short, 
the savings from the change in the 
rules for consumers would prove 





between the average prices actu-
ally realized under the two sys-
tems would, therefore, be the 
extent—and only the extent—to 





Setting aside for later consider-
ation the possibility that pay-as-
bid pricing might be more effective 
in curbing exertions of monopoly 
power, if there is no reason to 
expect that prices will be consis-
tently higher or lower under pay-










cates of a shift to pay-as-bid is, of 
course, that since all the infra-
marginal bids—the ones below the 
highest marginal cost output nec-
essary for the sum total of accepted 
bids to satisfy market demand—




 than their bid prices, the 
change in the rules would simply 
wipe out those markups; that the 
average price purchasers will have 
to pay under pay-as-bid will incor-
porate no markup above marginal 
costs at all. For example, if the suc-
cessful bids for a particular hour 
were of equal blocks of output 
with incremental costs, succes-










The larger the 
number of competing 
bidders on the 
supply side, the 




the change be expected to have? 
The main ones seem to us to be the 
following:
1. Pay-as-bid introduces some 
inevitable reduction in efﬁciency 
as generators ﬁnd themselves 
forced to depart from bidding their 
marginal costs if they are to receive 
any compensation for their ﬁxed 
costs or contribution to proﬁts. 
With all bids exceeding the mar-
ginal costs of all blocks of power, 
by amounts that depend upon the 
varying estimates of the several 
bidders of what will prove to be 
the marginal, market-clearing bid, 
the perfect, total cost-minimizing 
merit order dispatch will, inevita-
bly, no longer be assured: Some 
lower-marginal cost bids will be 
rejected—because their bidders 
have overestimated the market-
clearing price—in favor of other, 
higher-marginal-cost power 
offered with more conservative 
markups. Because so very much is 
at stake in terms of the bidders 
recovering their total costs or any 
proﬁt, and because the constantly 
changing demand and supply con-
ditions that will determine the 
market clearing price are in impor-
tant measure unpredictable and 
the ability of the several sellers to 
predict them likely to differ sub-
stantially, their several bids will 
vary correspondingly in the mark-
ups above marginal cost that 
they incorporate. The consequent 
inefﬁciencies stemming from 
departures from merit order 
dispatch of their plants are likely 
to be large. 
Inefﬁciencies will not be a conse-
quence of forecasting errors only, if 
bidders differ substantially and 
consistently in their relative mar-
ginal costs. In such circumstances, 
occasional inefﬁcient outcomes 






ple, if there are two bidders, one of 
which is known to have lower 
costs than the other on average, the 
bidder likely to have higher costs 
will rationally bid with a smaller 
markup over its operating costs, 
than the bidder with lower costs. 
The latter will feel free to incorpo-
The greater the number of separate 
generating companies, in contrast, 
the greater will be the number of 
instances in which output will be 
drawn from a higher-marginal-
cost generator in preference to a 
lower-cost one, because the owner 
of the former had bid on the basis of 
a more conservative prediction
of what the market-clearing price 
would turn out to be. Consumers 
end up bearing the costs of such 
inefﬁciencies.
2. Another inefﬁciency inescap-
ably introduced by moving to pay-
as-bid would be the cost of fore-
casting market prices that it would 
impose on all participants. Under 
the uniform, market-clearing price 
system, sellers have every motiva-
tion to bid their marginal costs, 
which are of course readily avail-
able to them. The change in the 
method of remunerating them 
would introduce large uncertain-
ties into their calculations and the 
correspondingly large costs of 
attempting to forecast what the 
market-clearing price or prices 
would turn out to be. These costs, 
too, would ultimately be borne by 
consumers.
3. Finally, and in a sense worst 
of all, it is likely to discourage 
competition—to which conse-
quence we now turn.
 
II. The Effect of the Proposed 
Change on the Exercise and 
Dissipation of Market Power
 
Once we move from the assump-
tion that generation markets are 
effectively competitive to the more 
realistic one that they are, at best, 
only imperfectly so, it becomes 
rate a larger markup in its bids, 
because it knows its rival is rela-
tively unlikely to underbid it. The 
consequence will be that the disad-
vantaged bidder will be called on 
to supply too often, because it will 
have submitted a lower bid in 
some instances in which it has 
higher costs than its rival.
Moreover, the larger the number 
of competing bidders on the sup-
ply side, the greater the resultant 
inefﬁciencies will be. Suppliers 
with a large complement of gener-
ating stations would continue to 
draw upon their several plants in 
the correct rank order, on the basis 
of their respective marginal costs.  
74
 




necessary to try to decide, ﬁrst, 
whether uniform price or pay-as-
bid is likely to be more conducive 
to the exercise of such market 
power as some of them may pos-
sess and to the dissipation of that 
power over time.
 




Under the uniform price rule, 
competitors prosper or fail on the 
basis of their relative generating 
efﬁciencies alone. Under pay-as-
bid, their proﬁtability depends 
heavily also on successful forecast-
ing. From the standpoint of mak-
ing generation markets more effec-
tively competitive, even more 
troublesome than the effect of pay-
as-bid in creating uncertainties 
and imposing the costs of forecast-
ing would be the differential rela-
tive burdens on small and large 
ﬁrms. There are large economies of 
scale in the efforts to gather the 
requisite information and make 
such forecasts on a continuing, 
hour-by-hour and day-by-day 
basis. The small ﬁrm would have 
to mount essentially the same kind 
of effort as a large one, at a much 
higher cost per unit of output. Not 
only will the uncertainties intro-
duced by pay-as-bid tend to dis-
courage the investment in addi-
tional generating facilities that is 
one major part of the essential 
long-term remedy of the industry’s 
present poor performance, it will 
have an especially discouraging 
effect on investment by small 
ﬁrms, the economic feasibility of 
which was an essential premise of 
deregulation itself.
There is a particularly ironic 
aspect of the relationship of these 
two alternative pricing methods 
on the prospects of smaller genera-
tors challenging the larger incum-
bents. One powerful impetus 
behind the proposed shift is the 
perception—which we will pro-
ceed to describe—that the uniform 
pricing system is susceptible to 
gaming by large bidders, with-
holding their supplies in times of 
game the system themselves in 
that way or have direct knowledge 
of the games large bidders may be 
planning to play, and therefore to 
reﬂect in their bids the anticipated 
leverage effect of such tactics on 
price. Under uniform price, no 
such forecasting is necessary: The 
monopolistically leveraged price 
automatically goes to all competi-
tors alike.
o the extent, then, that the 
present markets are insufﬁ-
ciently competitive and the success 
of deregulation depends—as in-
deed it does most fundamentally—
on making them more competi-





 to be 
counterproductive.
 
B. The Relative Susceptibility 
of Uniform Price and Pay-as-
Bid to Monopolistic Gaming
 
A substantial number of respon-
sible studies have concluded that 
the extreme price spikes in recent 
years, at times when demand 
would in any event have pressed 
hard on available capacity, were 
magniﬁed by some large genera-
tors “gaming” the system: know-
ing in advance that supplies were 
going to be short at those times, 
withholding some capacity in the 





 For a generator to beneﬁt 
from such a strategy several con-
ditions must hold. First, demand 
must, in the aggregate, be inelas-
tic. Second, the generator must 
control a mix of capacity such that 
withholding a unit from the mar-
ket will lever up the market clear-
ing price received by its other, 
successfully bidding units sufﬁ-
anticipated shortage in order to 
lever up the uniform price they 
receive on all their accepted bids. 
But under uniform price, smaller 
competitors likewise beneﬁt from 
any such exertions of monopoly 
power: They, too, automatically 
receive any monopolistically ele-
vated prices. We do not wish to 
make too much of the point, since 
we will conclude that the proposed 
reform, in itself, would not sub-
stantially alter that situation. To 
the extent that it does have such an 
effect, however, it will almost cer-
tainly be disproportionately at the 
expense of smaller competitors, 









ciently to more than compensate 
for the sacriﬁced net revenue on 
its withheld capacity. Observe 
that such a practice would not 
require a high degree of industry-
wide concentration, given the 
very thin margins of excess capac-
ity at the times of peak demand 
and the extreme inelasticity of 
demand in the short run. In these 
circumstances, it takes only a 
modest amount of withholding 
relative to the size of both the 
entire market and the total capac-
ity of the game-playing generator—
whether by simply not bidding 
some fraction of one’s operable 
capacity or deliberately bidding it 
at a price markedly above its 





his kind of perceived behavior 
has lent plausibility to the pro-
posal to substitute pay-as-bid for 
uniform market-clearing prices. It 
is only the prospect, under the 
present system, of receiving on 
all their sales the beneﬁt of the 
increase in market price caused by 
withholding some portion of their 
capacity that large generators 
can expect to proﬁt from that 
practice. The reasoning is that 
under pay-as-bid, in contrast, such 
generators would have to bid the 
estimated monopolistically ele-
vated price on all their proffered 
sales in order to reap those gains, 





that some or all of those higher 
bids will prove to have been exces-
sive and therefore be rejected. The 
consequent loss would be the 
entire difference between their 
actual marginal costs and the ulti-
mate market price. The proposed 
change in the pricing method 
would, by this reasoning, therefore 
dramatically alter the balance of 




Just as the naïve expectation that 
a shift to pay-as-bid will produce a 
dramatic reduction in the average 
prices consumers pay ignores the 
certainty that generators will radi-
cally alter their bidding practices 
to frustrate achievement of that 
result, the expectation that it 
ing will diminish the ability of the 





 A bidding process 
that is repeated daily is precisely 
the kind of game that lends itself to 
such collusion; changing the pric-
ing rule would not alter that. 
Indeed, recent experiments con-
ducted at Cornell University, the 
University of Arizona, and 
CalTech all suggest that experi-
mental subjects learn how to col-
lude tacitly under either pricing 
rule.
There is, however, one important 
difference between the two. The 
large generator, knowing that it is 
or will be withholding and when 
and by how much, is likely to be in 
a much better position than the 
small one to anticipate the results 
and incorporate those anticipa-
tions in all its bids. In this respect, 
once again, the shift to pay-as-bid 
will discourage the increased com-
petition that is a critical part of the 
long-run remedy.
nother possibly important dif-
ference that argues against 
moving to pay-as-bid is the greater 
transparency of bidding behavior 
under uniform pricing than under 
pay-as-bid facilitates attempts to 
detect collusion or quasi-collusion. 
As we have already emphasized, if 
the market were competitive all 
bidders would have every incen-
tive under uniform pricing to bid 
their true marginal costs. Since at 
least marginal generating costs are 
easily measured, to a ﬁrst-order 
approximation, it should be feasi-
ble to ascertain whether bid prices 
had exceeded those levels, and 
from this to infer that collusive or 
quasi-collusive bidding had 
would discourage monopolistic 
withholding fails to take into 
account the ways in which bidders 
will respond by changing their 
bidding behavior correspond-
ingly. If and to the extent that 
monopolistic withholding has 
occurred in the past, bidders 
would henceforward, under pay-
as-bid, attempt to predict the con-
sequent behavior of the market 
prices in their several bids and, to 
the extent they succeed, the antici-
pated beneﬁts of the change for 
consumers will prove to have been 
illusory.
We are somewhat skeptical also 










occurred. Under pay-as-bid, in 
contrast, every seller would be 
forced to bid above its marginal 
cost even if the market were per-
fectly competitive, so there would 
be no direct way for observers to 
identify exercises of market power 
from the bid data.
 
III. The Proposed Change 
in Confrontation with the 
Fundamental Causes of the 
Unsatisfactory Performance 
So Far and Other Possible 
Remedies
 
The roots of the unsatisfactory 
behavior of California markets 
since deregulation run far deeper 
than its particular method of 
remunerating bidders in power 
exchange (PX) markets. Assess-
ment of the required palliatives or 
remedies is correspondingly more 
complex.
he fundamental causes are, 
clearly, the inadequacy of 
generating capacity in the face of 
unexpectedly sharp increases in 
demand throughout the West, 
intensely aggravated by the many 
other adverse developments on 
both supply and demand sides to 
which we have already alluded. 
These would have produced 
sharp, painful increases in whole-
sale prices, both on average and 
particularly at times of peak 
demand, regardless of the 
method used for determining 
the compensation of bidding 
suppliers.
The proposed change in the bid-
ding rules that we have been 
asked to evaluate would in our 
judgment have at most only a 
slight effect in mitigating these 
problems and, if anything, intro-
duce new uncertainties that 
would, on balance, discourage the 
expansion of capacity (particu-
larly of smaller independents) 
that is one essential part of the 
fundamental remedy.
In rejecting this proposal as 
likely to be ineffective at best and, 
more likely, counterproductive, 
we by no means imply that 
 
A. Direct Interventions to 
Combat Strategic Withholding 
of Supplies
 
We concur in the suggestions of 
some of our witnesses that some 
agency should have the authority 
(1) to investigate incidents in 
which large generators may have 
engaged in strategic withholding 
of supplies in times of peak 
demand, with the effect of sharply 
increasing market-clearing prices; 
(2) to issue orders prohibiting such 
practices; and (3) to impose penal-
ties. If withholdings such as these 
were unilateral, it seems unlikely 
they could be attacked under the 
Federal antitrust laws; but orga-
nized exchanges do typically 
establish and enforce rules such as 
these, designed to ensure that they 
be free of manipulation. These are 
the functions that the Independent 
System Operator (ISO) and the PX 
in California (their Market Surveil-
lance and Market Monitoring 
Committees, respectively) 
assumed by undertaking to iden-
tify and correct market problems, 
whether the result of design ﬂaws 
or inadequate competition. This is 
critical when elasticity on the 
demand side of the market is at 
best immature and at worst nil. 
Without the ability of demand to 
respond to variable prices, those 
prices will be set entirely by the 







The legislation deregulating the 
industry in California speciﬁcally re-
quired the three California investor-
owned utilities (IOUs), until such 
other proposed actions—both 
palliative and more fundamen-
tally corrective—are not worthy 
of consideration; on the contrary. 
As pointed out in our introduc-
tion, however, we refrain from 
attempting to assess these various 
possibilities not merely because 
that was not part of our assigned 
task, but, more deﬁnitively, 
because we have not had the 
opportunity even to attempt to 
reach an informed consensus 
about them. At the same time, we 
have formulated some at least 
provisional opinions about some 
of these alternative approaches 









time as they sold off their genera-
tion, to offer all of their energy for 
sale through the Cal PX and ISO, 
thereby in effect receiving the mar-
ket clearing price. Until such time 
as they had recovered all of their 
agreed-upon stranded costs, the 
local distribution companies were 
required also to purchase all of 
their energy through the Cal PX 
and to sell to their customers at a 
regulated rate intended to give all 
customers immediate beneﬁts of 
deregulation. This effectively pre-
vented them from entering into 
forward contracts with generating 
companies for energy, evidently in 
the belief that only in this way 
could emergence of an effectively 





 For these and various 
other reasons, virtually all energy 
for retail sale in the state of Califor-





 instead of a large 
portion being hedged through for-
ward purchases.
everal parties, including, pro-
visionally, FERC, have speciﬁ-
cally urged that the two remaining 
IOUs be permitted to enter into 





 Indeed, the Market Surveil-





 to do so.
The availability of unrestricted 
long-term contracting offers some 
promise of improving market per-
formance, since it provides a wider 
variety of options to both buyers 
and sellers. Its effect on average 
prices in the short run would prob-
ably be modest, since forward con-
tracts do not by themselves alter 
the immediate balance of supply 
and demand that, along with a 
possible monopolistic behavior, 
has been responsible for the price 
spikes of the past months. Those 
underlying price-inﬂating factors 
are likely to be reﬂected at least 
partially in the terms of any long-
term contracts into which genera-
tors would be willing to enter. 
Nonetheless, long-term contract-




Limit the consequences of 




Help smaller entrants raise the 
necessary capital and by so doing 
enhance the competitiveness of 
wholesale markets.
s we understand it, the prohi-
bition or active discourage-
ment of contracting outside the 
ISO and PX had two purposes. The 
ﬁrst, to which we have already 
alluded, was to encourage the 
emergence of a competitive whole-
sale market that would separate 
the operation of the transmission 
system (the ISO) from the effectua-
tion of purchases and sales of elec-
tricity. The expectation was also 
that requiring the vertically inte-
grated IOUs to sell their genera-
tion through the PX and purchase 
their energy at the market clearing 
prices in that exchange (and, in real 
time, the ISO) would limit their 
ability to exercise market power. 
Ironically, the restriction has appar-
ently conferred some market 
power on the now-independent 
generators and exposed the IOUs 
and their customers to disastrous 
ﬁnancial consequences.
The second purpose of the Legis-
lature and consumer advocates 
was to protect smaller customers 
from “cream-skimming”: The fear 
was that if the competitive market 
were opened ﬁrst to large cus-
tomers, with whom generators 
could enter into long-term con-
tracts, they would reap all the ben-
eﬁts of competition, using their 
purchasing power to sew up sup-
plies at favorable rates, at the 
expense of the smaller customers, 
who would be permitted to enter 
the market only later. The error 
here was the apparently under-
lying perception that competition 







Permit voluntary sharing 
between generators and their cus-
tomers of the risks of extreme mar-
ket ﬂuctuations, which would in 





Even more important, con-
tribute to the ultimate solution of 
California’s problems, so far as 
the supply side is concerned, by 
offering generators, both existing 
and potential, assurances that 
could encourage them to make 
the long-term commitments 











is a zero-sum game—that if buyer 
A beneﬁts by taking advantage 
of it, it will be at the expense of 
buyers B through Z.
An important way in which 
competition works in the real 
world, however, is by large buyers 
exerting their purchasing power to 
obtain favorable prices. That is not 
a zero-sum game: Those favorable 
rates are not typically obtained at 
the expense of smaller buyers, but 
help break down monopoly and 
collusive pricing structures, to the 
beneﬁt of customers generally.
 
C. Promoting Customer 
Price Response
 
A critical deﬁciency in the Cali-
fornia market, which we have 
already emphasized, is the unre-
sponsiveness of demand to even 
radically changing prices. The 
decision to require the IOUs to 
freeze their retail prices (subject to 
a guaranteed reduction) until they 
had recovered their stranded costs 
precluded any such response.
Demand-side responsiveness to 
price is essential to the operation 
of a restructured market—the pro-
motion of increased efﬁciency in 
the use of electricity, in the long 
term, and a much more elastic 
response to short-term peak prices. 
We have had neither the commis-
sion nor the opportunity to make 
more concrete recommendations 
for promoting these goals. We can-
not refrain, however, from empha-
sizing how essential it is, if con-
sumers are to modify their 
purchasing habits in response to 
extreme ﬂuctuations in price and 
by so doing to moderate those ﬂuc-
tuations, that they be offered 
inducements by their suppliers to 
permit their use of power to be 
curtailed and/or confront retail 
prices that vary with the corre-





The design of electric industry 
deregulation in California has 
clearly proved to be fatally ﬂawed. 
The expectation behind the pro-
posal to shift from uniform to as-
bid pricing—that it would provide 
purchasers of electric power 
substantial relief from soaring 
prices, such as they have recently 
experienced—is simply mistaken. 
In our view, it would do con-









In most cases, the marginal opportu-
nity cost is just the incremental cost of 
generating additional energy. For hydro 
power, however, it has little to do with 
physical operating costs, consisting 
rather of the revenue or value sacriﬁced 
by using or selling it today rather than 
later, or in one place in California rather 
than elsewhere, both of which depend in 
turn on how full the reservoirs are and 
expectations about future prices. Even 
for fossil and nuclear plants, the mar-
ginal opportunity cost may differ from 
incremental operating costs to the extent 
there are opportunities to sell the energy 




The U.S. Treasury conducted an exper-
iment, in which it employed both uni-
form pricing and pay-as-bid mecha-
nisms in the sale of Treasury bills. It 
found mixed results, and could not 
conclude that the average winning 
bid prices of the two mechanisms dif-
fered signiﬁcantly. See, for example, 
Christine M. Archibald and Paul F. 
Malvey, 
 
Uniform-Price Auctions: Update of 
the Treasury Experience
 
, working paper, 
U.S. Treasury, 1998; and Gregory Belzer 
and Vincent Reinhart, 
 
Some Evidence on 
Bid Sharing and the Use of Information in 
the U.S. Treasury’s Auction Experiment
 
, 
working paper, Board of Governors of 


















See, for example, Paul Joskow and 
Edward Kahn, 
 
A Quantitative Analysis of 
Pricing Behavior In California’s Wholesale 
Electricity Market During Summer 2000
 
, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), Cambridge, MA, Working 
Paper No. 8157, March 2001; Robert 
A critical deﬁciency is the unresponsiveness of demand to even
radically changing prices. 
July 2001
 




Nordhaus, Carl Shapiro, and Frank A. 
Wolak, 
 
An Analysis of the June 2000 Price 
Spikes in the California ISO’s Energy and 
Ancillary Services Markets
 
, Sept. 6, 2000; 
and Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell, 
and Frank Wolak, 
 
Diagnosing Market 
Power in California’s Restructured Whole-
sale Electricity Market
 
, NBER Working 




It might appear that the effect of such 
exertions of market power would be 
indistinguishable from the effect of a ris-
ing peak demand in a situation of inade-
quate capacity even under pure or per-
fect competition: Firms with no market 
power would likewise be expected to 
withhold capacity in expectation of soar-
ing competitive prices. That would 
indeed be expected in any other indus-
try, in which supplies withheld today 
can be sold tomorrow at prices increased 
by such withholding. It would not be true, 
however, in the case of electric power. 
Power (except hydro) that is not offered 
in the market today cannot be stored and 
offered tomorrow. The small generator 
who withholds in this way simply loses 
the sales it could have made today. Only 
a generator with aggregate capacity 
greater than the anticipated shortage 
could proﬁt by sacriﬁcing some portion 
of the sales it is physically capable of 
making in the expectation of gaining 
more from the consequent increase in the 
difference between the newly elevated 
market price and its own marginal costs 
on the sales that it continues to make.
On the other hand, the fact that prices 
at such times may exceed the marginal 
operating costs of the least efﬁcient gen-
erator in use—the usual indicator of 
monopolistic withholding of output—
does not in itself prove that such with-
holding has occurred: When demand 
reaches the absolute physical limit of 
capacity—i.e., supply becomes totally 
unresponsive to price—the competitive 
price will rise to whatever level neces-
sary to reduce the quantities demanded 




This risk is not great at peak times, 
when there is little aggregate excess 




See, for example, Giulio Federico and 
David Rahman, 
 
Bidding in an Electricity 
Pay-as-Bid Auction
 
, occasional paper, 
Nufﬁeld College, Oxford, U.K., and Uni-
versity of California at Los Angeles, for 
submission to California Power 







tates Collusion: The Case of Electricity Mar-
kets
 
, occasional paper, European Univ. 
Institute, for submission to California 
Power Exchange Blue Ribbon Panel, Oct. 
2000; and Carlos Vazquez, Michel Rivier, 
and Ignacio J. Perez-Arriaga, 
 
On the Use 
of Pay-as-Bid Auctions in California: Some 
Criticisms and an Alternative Proposal
 
, IIT 




This may appear to be an odd kind of 
deregulation. The essential premise of 
deregulation is, however, that competition 
will effectively protect consumers from 
monopoly. If the inadequacy of capacity, 
in confrontation with an extremely inelas-
tic demand, has created opportunities for 
the exertion of such power, it would be 
blindly ideological simply to refuse to 
proceed against such manipulations, 
while taking pains not to interfere with 
the longer-term corrective of additions to 
capacity and more effective efforts to cur-




The IOUs were able to purchase via 
forward contracts through the CalPX—
but only through the PX—after it ﬁrst 
made block forward contracts available 
in July 1999. Although there are regula-
tory limits on the amount of forward 
positions that each IOU may take, they 
have not reached those limits in availing 
themselves of this opportunity. They 
may have been discouraged from doing 
so by their past experience with forward 
purchases in California, in both gas and 
electric, under which regulators forced 
them to absorb any losses stemming 
from the contract prices exceeding 
wholesale market prices while not being 
permitted to reap the beneﬁts when the 
contractual prices were lower. In any 
event, what the IOUs are vociferously 
seeking is the ability to negotiate con-




We consider both the day-ahead and 
real-time markets to be spot markets. 
Energy contracted more than one day in 




“An essential remedy is the elimina-
tion of rules that prevent market partici-
pants from managing their risks. Mov-
ing signiﬁcant amounts of wholesale 
transactions into forward markets will 
(1) reduce reliance on spot markets, 
thereby directly reducing both the likeli-
hood and the adverse economic conse-
quences of pricing volatility; (2) elimi-
nate the adverse reliability impacts that 
the ISO faces each day as its obligation to 
operate a real-time balance market has 
become transformed into operating the 
major commodity exchange at the last 
minute; (3) increase the likelihood of 
new generation entry because the uncer-
tain revenue stream from spot markets 
will not attract the necessary capital 
investments; and (4) limit the ability of 
sellers to exercise market power in spot 
markets.” Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, Order Proposing Remedies 
for California Wholesale Electric Mar-
kets, Docket No. EL00-95-000, Washing-




The MSC contended additionally that 
the ability and/or incentive of genera-
tors to exercise market power in spot 
markets is increased by the absence of a 
signiﬁcant amount of forward contract-
ing. See, for example, Robert Nordhaus, 
Frank A. Wolak, and Carl Shapiro, 
 
Anal-
ysis of “Order Proposing Remedies for Cali-
fornia Wholesale Electric Markets (issued 
November 1, 2000),”
 
 Market Surveillance 
Committee of the California Indepen-
dent System Operator, Dec. 1, 2000, at 
27–28, ftp:/ /zia.stanford.edu/pub/
papers/MSCDEC01. pdf or http:/ /
www.caiso.com/docs/2000/12/01/
2000120116120227219.pdf (July 6, 2001).